Vulnerability Disclosure: Best Practice Guidelines by Day, Jeff et al.
Vulnerability Disclosure  Release 2.0, September 2021
Best Practice Guidelines
© 2021 IoT Security Foundation
 
 
Vulnerability Disclosure Best Practice Guidelines, Release 2.0 Page 2/22 © 2021 IoT Security Foundation
  
Notices, Disclaimer, Terms of Use, Copyright and Trade Marks and 
Licensing 
Notices 
Documents published by the IoT Security Foundation (“IoTSF”) are subject to regular review and may 
be updated or subject to change at any time. The current status of IoTSF publications, including this 
document, can be seen on the public website at: https://iotsecurityfoundation.org/  
 
Terms of Use 
The role of IoTSF in providing this document is to promote contemporary best practices in IoT security 
for the benefit of society. In providing this document, IoTSF does not certify, endorse or affirm any 
third parties based upon using content provided by those third parties and does not verify any 
declarations made by users. 
In making this document available, no provision of service is constituted or rendered by IoTSF to any 
recipient or user of this document or to any third party.  
Disclaimer 
IoT security (like any aspect of information security) is not absolute and can never be guaranteed. New 
vulnerabilities are constantly being discovered, which means there is a need to monitor, maintain and 
review both policy and practice as they relate to specific use cases and operating environments on a 
regular basis. 
IoTSF is a non-profit organisation which publishes IoT security best practice guidance materials. 
Materials published by IoTSF include contributions from security practitioners, researchers, industrially 
experienced staff and other relevant sources from IoTSF's membership and partners. IoTSF has a multi-
stage process designed to develop contemporary best practice with a quality assurance peer review 
prior to publication. While IoTSF provides information in good faith and makes every effort to supply 
correct, current and high-quality guidance, IoTSF provides all materials (including this document) solely 
on an ‘as is’ basis without any express or implied warranties, undertakings or guarantees. 
The contents of this document are provided for general information only and do not purport to be 
comprehensive. No representation, warranty, assurance or undertaking (whether express or implied) 
is or will be made, and no responsibility or liability to a recipient or user of this document or to any 
third party is or will be accepted by IoTSF or any of its members (or any of their respective officers, 
employees or agents), in connection with this document or any use of it, including in relation to the 
adequacy, accuracy, completeness or timeliness of this document or its contents. Any such 
responsibility or liability is expressly disclaimed. 
Nothing in this document excludes any liability for: (i) death or personal injury caused by negligence; 
or (ii) fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation. 
By accepting or using this document, the recipient or user agrees to be bound by this disclaimer. This 
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1   Introduction 
1.1 Overview  
It is vital to the commercial interests of providers of Internet of Things (IoT) products and solutions and 
to the security of their customers, that vulnerabilities are discovered and remediated as soon as 
possible.  Third party security researchers are a valuable adjunct to a provider’s internal resources in 
addressing this goal.  To ensure effective co-operation and maintain good relations with external 
security researchers, it is important for providers to define and communicate vulnerability disclosure 
processes that not only describe how they would like vulnerabilities to be reported confidentially to 
them, but also set expectations as to how they will process and act upon such reports.  This process 
should include provision of feedback to the discovering researcher, and the public announcement of 
the security vulnerability, usually after the release of a software patch, hardware fix, or other 
remediation. 
The ETSI 303 645 standard [4], which lays down baseline security requirements for the consumer IoT, 
includes requirement 5.2, to “Implement a means to manage reports of vulnerabilities”. This states 
that “The manufacturer shall make a vulnerability disclosure policy publicly available.”, adding that “A 
vulnerability disclosure policy clearly specifies the process through which security researchers and 
others are able to report issues.”  
The following document provides manufacturers, integrators, distributors, and retailers of IoT 
products and services with a set of guidelines for handling the disclosure of security vulnerabilities, 
based on best practice and international standards.  




This document presents best practice guidelines for a vulnerability disclosure process, recommended 
for adoption by IoT solution providers, device vendors and service providers. 
It is based on international standards ISO/IEC 29147:2018, Information technology -- Security 
techniques -- Vulnerability disclosure [1] and ISO/IEC 30111:2019 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Vulnerability handling processes [2]. These ISO documents cover the vulnerability 
disclosure subject in fine detail and are available for purchase on the ISO website. NIST SP800-216 
‘Recommendations for Federal Vulnerability Disclosure Guidelines’ [5] is an example of guidelines 
based upon these two ISO/IEC standards. 
The following terms are used in alignment with ISO/IEC 29147:2018 [1] and ISO/IEC 30111:2019 [2]: 
•  Vendor – “The individual or organization that is responsible for remediating vulnerabilities” - 
Typically the developer, maintainer, producer, manufacturer, supplier, installer, or provider of a 
product or service. 
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•  Reporter – “An individual or organization that notifies a vendor of a potential vulnerability” – 
Typically individuals, organizations, amateurs or hobbyists, professionals, end-users, security 
researchers, vendors, governments, or other interested party. 
NOTE ON DATA PROTECTION:  This document does not address the management of any data breach 
which may have resulted from the exploitation of a security vulnerability.  An organisation’s 
responsibilities regarding this are usually determined by prevailing legislation and government 
regulations (particularly regarding individuals’ personal data) in the territories and/or industry sectors 
in which they operate.  An organisation must ensure it is fully aware of, and in compliance with, all 
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2 Vulnerability Disclosure Policy 
A Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (Policy) is a publicly available document, typically accessed via the 
Vendor’s reporting web page.  It is the Vendor’s statement as to how they will handle any vulnerability 
report passed to them.  There is no set text for such a Policy, but there are many examples available 
online that can help as a starting point.  The NCSC toolkit [3] and ISO 29147:2018 [1] both provide 
sample policy text, and numerous well known technology companies have published their own 
policies. 
There are however certain key points to consider when developing a Vulnerability Disclosure Policy: 
• Use plain language. Avoid complicated or specialist terminology. 
 
• A draft Policy is required to direct the establishment of internal processes and resources. 
The processes and resources need to be fully tested so that it is clear how the overall 
system (reporting->mitigation) will operate. Only once the processes are verified should 
the final Policy be published.  
• Always get approval from the legal team before publishing. 
• Clearly define the scope of what is and isn’t covered by the Policy. 
• Explain the appropriate means of communication and Vendor contact details, e.g. the 
designated reporting web page, email address, encryption requirements etc. (as 
required). 
• Explain what information is needed as part of any report submission. 
• Define the time scales involved.  Be realistic so the Vendor always has a fair chance of 
meeting their own targets.  However also consider that the Reporter will be eager to see 
the issue is being resolved; overly-long-time scales may make the Reporter feel that the 
Vendor lacks urgency in the matter.  Be this a right or wrong assessment, it doesn’t help 
to set the relationship off on a good footing. 
• Explain what kind of reporting structure will be in place, i.e., how the Reporter will be 
kept updated by the Vendor, and what happens once the issue has been fully assessed.  
For example, the Policy may say that after initial confirmation of receipt, the Vendor 
aims to provide initial feedback to the Reporter to advise on their findings; what 
happens thereafter may depend on what is found. 
• Also state in the Policy that if the Vendor has to refer out to a 3rd party (e.g., if the 
product uses third-party proprietary code) then the time required for assessment and 
development of mitigations may need to be extended. The additional time will depend 
on the priority given to the issue by the 3rd party, which is largely beyond the control of 
the Vendor. In such circumstances, a reliable estimate of completion time may be 
difficult to obtain. 
• Bear in mind vulnerability reports may be generated from inside the Vendor’s company.  
Any Policy should either apply to both public Reporters and internal Reporters, or a 
separate internal Policy will need to be written.  It would be expected that the internal 
Policy version should align closely with the public Policy version. 
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• The Policy should also make it clear what actions a Reporter must refrain from when 
hunting for vulnerabilities, such as conducting unapproved denial of service attacks, load 
tests, social engineering, or other undesirable activities. 
• Reporters should also be reminded that any activities they undertake must always 
remain within legal boundaries. 
• Given all the above points, do keep in mind that the Reporter is generally trying to do 
the right thing by making the Vendor aware of an issue with their product.  The Vendor 
should aim to be respectful of the Reporter’s intent, work with the Reporter and behave 
in a fair and professional manner.  This approach should be reflected in the wording of 
the Policy, whereby the overall process operates with the Vendor and Reporter working 
together in a coordinated fashion.  This approach will promote positive outcomes for 
everyone. 
• To support positive engagement with Reporters, the Policy should also state how, and 
under what circumstances, the Reporter will be recognised for their contribution. 
Typically, this could be thanking the Reporter within an Advisory notice published as part 
of any vulnerability mitigation activities, and/or perhaps posting their name on the 
original reporting page.  However, such recognition must only be done with the 
Reporter’s written agreement and with clarification on how they want to be identified, 
e.g., Reporter’s Name + Employer Name, or Reporter’s Name + Twitter handle etc., 
whatever they reasonably request. 
• ‘Bug Bounties’ – A Policy must make it clear whether or not the Vendor offers financial 
(or other kinds of) rewards for identifying vulnerabilities.  If a Vendor decides they do 
want to offer financial incentives, they should consider the following issues before 
committing to such an approach: 
- A financial incentive is likely to encourage more vulnerability reports than may 
happen if no rewards were offered.  This creates a greater workload on the whole 
vulnerability disclosure management pipeline. It may also create a need to triage 
the priority of each disclosure, with the added risk of a Reporter whose 
vulnerability is deemed ‘low priority’ deciding to go public. 
- With potential financial rewards on offer, there is an increased chance some 
Reporters may have fraudulent intent in mind.  At best this wastes a Vendor’s 
time & resources, at worst it could defraud the Vendor. 
- The Vendor must determine a payment framework.  How will that work?  Will 
there be just one fixed payment, regardless of the type of vulnerability reported?  
Will there be a sliding scale of payment, and if so, then what measure is used to 
position a given vulnerability on the payment scale?  Reporters may not be happy 
with their reward value if they feel their findings merit a higher reward.  If several 
significantly high-risk vulnerabilities are identified by Reporters, rated as per the 
Policy as deserving high value rewards, what financial impact will this have on the 
Vendor company’s finances? 
- An unscrupulous developer who works for the Vendor may decide to write 
vulnerabilities into a product’s source code.  Subsequently they (or an accomplice) 
could then ‘discover’ a vulnerability and claim the bounty.  Irrespective of this 
fraudulent behaviour, isn’t a developer who discovers a vulnerability in their 
employer’s code just doing their job, which they are getting paid to resolve/avoid 
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anyway, so are they truly entitled to a bounty reward?  Has this kind of scenario 
been covered by a clear clause in the Policy around employees/contractors and 
their bug bounty entitlements? 
- What happens if several Reporters report the same  vulnerability? Will they share 
the reward? Will it go to the first to report it? 
 
These and many other possible issues may make the reality of offering bug bounties problematic for 
some organisations.  Bounties are not necessarily the wrong thing to do, however a Vendor should 
consider the implications carefully, and consult their legal and finance teams, before committing to 
offering financial rewards. 
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3 Vulnerability Disclosure Process Guidelines 
Figure 1 shows a high-level process Vendors can follow to manage vulnerability disclosure.  The 
Vendor’s process runs down the middle of the flowchart, with inputs & outputs to each side. Ideally, 





















It is up to each individual Vendor to decide exactly what process to adopt, but it is important to be 
clear about the process in public materials, websites and in communications with Reporters, to align 
expectations. 
A senior executive should own the process and have overall responsibility within the company for 
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The rest of this document looks at the issues involved at each stage of this process. 
3.1 Vulnerability Report Received 
3.1.1 Publicising the point of contact 
It is essential that Reporters of vulnerabilities can be readily channelled to the right point of contact 
within a Vendor’s organisation, so it is imperative to make this information easy to find on the Vendor’s 
web site. The Vendor should place a web page giving the contact instructions in a standard, well-known 
location. Two conventions are explained below: 
1. https://www.companydomain/security.  E.g. Reporters can contact the IoT Security Foundation 
at https://www.iotsecurityfoundation.org/security if they want to report some kind of 
vulnerability issue with any of the Foundation’s products or services. 
2. The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) recommend using the security.txt convention. 
This is a proposed internet standard whereby machine-parsable information about the 
vulnerability disclosure process is provided in the location https:/www.companydomain/.well-




A link to the vulnerability reporting page should also be included in the web site’s “Contact Us” page. 
Details of any vulnerability should be handled securely at least until a mitigating solution is available.  
Therefore, Reporters should be offered a secure mechanism for reporting their findings.  Typically, this 
could be via a web form submitted over an HTTPS connection.  Alternatively, a Reporter may wish to 
remain anonymous or use a pseudonym and have their own preferred method of secure 
communication (see section 3.1.3 on ‘Capturing Vulnerability Details’); in this situation the Vendor 
should remain flexible and accommodate the Reporter if it does not compromise the Vendor. Keep in 
mind that if alternative, less secure communication options are provided, these may increase the risk 
of early exposure of the new vulnerability. 
3.1.2 Web Page Text 
As a minimum the page should state, or provide a link to, the Vendor’s full Vulnerability Disclosure 
Policy, and a secure means to submit details about the vulnerability the Reporter has found. 
It is recommended that the amount of text on the front page of a vulnerability reporting site be kept 
to a minimum.  If a Reporter is faced with pages of block text, they may be put off and not bother to 
make the report, which is counterproductive. 
3.1.3 Capturing Vulnerability Details 
There are two issues to consider at this stage: (1) the Reporter themselves; (2) what they must report. 
Some Reporters will be keen to give you their name and full contact details, whereas others may be 
reticent about revealing their identity, especially if their journey to finding the vulnerability bordered 
on the edge of legality.  Either approach needs to be respectfully maintained, as any breakdown in 
trust between the Reporter and Vendor will only hinder information gathering.  Such a break down in 
trust may lead to a Reporter taking unilateral action.  This could result in early public exposure of 
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details of the vulnerability, or perhaps negative reports in the media, unjustified or not, with 
consequential impact to brand image, loss of sales etc. as possible outcomes.  It is therefore best to 
try and maintain a trusted relationship with a Reporter as far as possible. 
As previously stated, aim to collect information about the vulnerability via a secure channel. Exactly 
what information is required from the Reporter will depend on the nature of the vulnerability being 
reported.  However, some basic details will always be required, typically: 
• Reporter’s name (or self-declared pseudonym) 
• Reporter’s contact details:  Email, phone number(s), Twitter handle, Facebook, 
etc. (but they may not offer any these) 
• Reporter’s reference number (if applicable) 
• Positive confirmation from the Reporter they have read & understood the 
Vendor’s Vulnerability Disclosure Policy 
• Name of affected product/service, plus specific version number, model number, 
serial number etc. 
• Any Proof of Concept (PoC) setup details 
• Description of steps to reproduce the issue 
• Perceived impact and severity if the vulnerability were to be exploited 
• Any perceived impact on other products, services, vendors etc. 
• Any intended further actions by the Reporter, their expectations from the Vendor 
etc. 
• Other relevant information 
 
The Reporter may wish only to reveal limited information at this stage. As the dialogue between the 
Reporter and Vendor progresses, it is often possible to gain further details of the exact nature of the 
vulnerability that the Reporter has discovered. 
3.1.3.1 Information Gathering Options – Web Form 
Offering a web form to complete allows the Vendor to collect the above information from the Reporter 
in a structured and uniform way.  This simplifies the task of capturing and processing reports, but 
requires web forms to be designed, developed, and maintained.  A well-designed form will help the 
average user who has stumbled across something they think needs reporting to provide the required 
information as best they can. However, a badly designed form with poorly worded questions can be 
confusing, deterring reporting and resulting in poor quality data being captured. 
3.1.3.2 Information Gathering Options – Encrypted Email 
An alternative mechanism for providing vulnerability details is encrypted email.  More technically 
knowledgeable Reporters may be happy to report via an email encrypted with the Vendor’s Open PGP 
public key.  If offering this option, the Vendor’s public PGP key should be provided on the reporting 
page, along with a link to the Open PGP website for further information. 
The reporting page should also state the email address the Reporter should send to. Within the 
industry the address would typically be expected to be one of the following: 
•  security-alert@companydomain.com 
•  security@companydomain.com 
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•  psirt@companydomain.com    (Product Security Incident Response Team) 
•  csirt@companydomain.com    (Computer Security Incident Response Team) 
3.1.4 Initial Report Handling 
Once a report has been submitted, the receiving system should immediately return an automated 
response to acknowledge the Vendor has successfully received the report.  Once they receive the 
response, the Reporter will consider that the notification to the Vendor has taken place and will be 
expecting prompt action.  It is therefore important the incoming report is immediately flagged to a 
specific incident response team within the Vendor organisation for attention. 
The Vendor’s incident response team must always have sufficient resources to ensure: 
A) The report is logged and documented, and passed on as soon as possible to the 
relevant party to investigate 
 
B) An acknowledgement is sent back to the Reporter to advise the issue is now being 
investigated 
 
C) Internal and customer communications are managed effectively. 
 
The initial report handling stage should not come to a halt just because someone goes on leave for two 
weeks.  Failing to meet the Vendor’s first response target as defined in their own Policy will not start 
the process well in the eyes of the Reporter (see other comments around maintaining trust with 
Reporters). 
3.1.5 Communicating with the Reporter 
All communications with the Reporter must be professional, consistent and in line with the published 
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy.  Reporters may have a wide variety of backgrounds and expectations; 
they may be, for example, hobbyists unused to business processes, academics who desire the freedom 
to publish research, or professional consultants building a reputation for expertise in finding security 
problems.  It is important, in communication with Reporters, that due consideration and recognition 
is given to the effort they have devoted to researching the particular security problem.  Their 
motivation and expectations may well differ from the Vendor’s, so it is imperative they are given 
enough room to work with the Vendor and that a constructive, understanding tone is always adopted, 
even if their actions may seem inappropriate in the Vendor’s business context. 
Sometimes a Reporter might stipulate a time scale by which the Vendor should respond in some way, 
after which the vulnerability will be publicly disclosed.  Usually, this statement is made to encourage 
less engaged Vendors to take timely action, or the Reporter wishes to present it at a major conference 
of cyber researchers (e.g.: DEF CON).  Responsible Vendors will naturally engage in addressing a 
reported vulnerability in a timely fashion, but sometimes for good reasons these time scales won’t 
match the expectations of a Reporter.  Rather than take affront and refuse to accept an imposed time 
limit, Vendors are encouraged to have an open discussion with Reporters and reach agreement on 
how a solution can best be delivered.  Most Reporters will be accommodating to honest and realistic 
responses in this matter. 
There may be many people involved in investigating a report, therefore it is recommended to have just 
one single communications point within the Vendor’s process.  This will help ensure all 
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communications are consistent, minimise the risk of messages getting lost, help avoid confusion for 
the Reporter and enable end to end traceability of the overall report handling. 
3.1.6 Report Ownership and Communication 
Every report received should have an owner who has the consequential responsibility for ensuring 
standards are maintained in terms of communications and adherence to published time scales.  The 
incident response team should have overall ownership for every report received, and for ensuring 
continuity in the absence of the nominated owner.  It then becomes their responsibility to handle all 
communications with the Reporter and ensure every report is processed through to conclusion in 
accordance with the published Policy.  This team don’t have to do the actual investigation and any 
subsequent technical work, but they must ensure the report is tracked and addressed in accordance 
with the Policy (communications, timing etc.). 
Vendor communications, both internally and to its customers, are also important, for example: 
• Briefing Senior executives on the resolution of the vulnerability discovery. 
• Ensuring consistent messaging on the progress and vulnerability details across the Vendor’s 
organization and in any customer communications. 
 
The content of vulnerability communications should be provided by and/or authorized by the incident 
response team. This is to ensure consistent and accurate communication with audiences who are 
unlikely to have an in depth understanding of the nuances of the security vulnerability disclosure. The 
PR/media communications and legal teams may also be involved prior to public disclosure. This can 
be crucial in supporting business development teams in their management of customer relations. 
 
3.2 Acknowledgement of Report Submission 
Once the incident response team have passed the report on to be investigated, they should then send 
an acknowledgement to the Reporter advising their report is now under initial investigation.  This gives 
the Reporter some comfort that a real person is now dealing with their report. 
The acknowledgement should at least include the following: 
•  Thank the Reporter for submitting the report. 
•  Provide a link to the Vendor’s Vulnerability Disclosure Policy. 
•  Provide contact details to which the Reporter can make any further communications 
with the Vendor‘s incident response team. 
•  Advise what will happen next and when. 
3.3 Investigation of the Report 
The incident response team should send the report to the responsible party in the Vendor’s 
organisation to verify whether the vulnerability is real or not.  It must be clear in the handover 
documentation what the response time scales are, as defined in the published Policy. 
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The triage activity will be somewhat specific to the nature of the Vendor’s business, but the following 
points should be noted: 
• Careful attention should be paid to any set up requirements given by the Reporter 
and other points of note they may have indicated to reproduce the problem. 
• Monitor progress against the response time scale.  Any significant anticipated or 
real deviation from this should be flagged back to the incident response team as 
soon as possible.  A decision can then be made to consider what communication 
is necessary with the Reporter. 
• If the reported vulnerability cannot be reproduced by the investigating team, seek 
further communication with the Reporter (via the incident response team) and 
work with them collaboratively to try and identify the underlying problem. 
• If the vulnerability is deemed to be real, the Vendor will, among other things, 
need to consider the following:  Is the vulnerability within the Vendor’s own 
product or actually within a contributing 3rd party’s product (e.g. 3rd party 
software library); is this a duplicate of an already known vulnerability; what other 
products may be impacted; what is the severity of the vulnerability; what might 
be the cost of mitigation; is the product still supported; what is the priority of 
remediation; and is it actually a security issue rather than a functional issue ? 
• The outcome of the initial investigation must be reported back to the incident 
response team as soon as possible.  The decision(s) of the investigation must be 
clear and unambiguous. 
 
3.4 Action Required? 
There are two potential outcomes here, either the Vendor decides action is required, or it is not 
required. 
3.4.1 Action is not required 
The Vendor may decide action is not required for either of two reasons: 
•  The Vendor is satisfied the vulnerability is not real 
         or 
•  The Vendor has made a business decision that although the vulnerability is real, they 
will not be taking action because of XYZ reason. 
In real world scenarios, not all vulnerabilities will be considered urgent or even worthy of a fix by a 
Vendor. There may be good reasons not to address a known vulnerability – for example if it is judged 
to be minor or of low/no impact. Such a decision must not be taken lightly however and should be 
considered as an exceptional approach only.  Not mitigating a vulnerability may result in real 
compromises occurring, with a consequential impact (to varying degrees) on the Vendor’s products 
and services, third-party equipment, customers’ privacy, convenience or networks, the Internet, the 
Vendor’s brand image, future sales etc.  Someone of appropriate authority/responsibility within the 
Vendor organisation must be made clearly aware of the potential impact of no action and be prepared 
to sign off to accept such a risk on behalf of the business.  If in doubt, fix the vulnerability. 
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3.4.2 Action is required 
If the Vendor determines the vulnerability is real, they must now, in coordination with the incident 
response team, move the process on to the next stage of developing and deploying a mitigating 
solution. 
3.4.3 Communication with the Reporter 
Whatever action the Vendor decides to adopt, they should communicate with the Reporter at this 
stage to appraise them of the outcome of the initial investigation.  The Reporter should, of course, be 
thanked for their interest, help and support with the report and informed of what will happen next (if 
anything), in accordance with the Policy. 
Where the decision has been made to take no action, the Vendor must be very clear on why that is.  If 
it believes there is no vulnerability to address, this must be clearly explained in the communications 
with the Reporter, outlining the reasoning behind this outcome.  The investigation team may have 
already engaged with the Reporter to help diagnose the issue, in which case the outcome of no 
vulnerability shouldn’t come as a surprise. If, however, this is the first communication back to the 
Reporter since receipt acknowledgement, the Reporter should receive a clear explanation of the 
findings to help them understand why their submission resulted in no action. 
If the Vendor decides to take no action against a real vulnerability, they need to provide the Reporter 
with a clear explanation as to why the Vendor is taking this stance.  Keep in mind the Reporter’s values 
are more likely to align with concerns about the impact on the user and may not align with those of 
the Vendor. 
3.4.4 Resolving Conflict 
A Vendor should be prepared for significant pushback from the Reporter to the news ‘their’ 
vulnerability won’t be resolved.  The Reporter will have their own views on the issue, which may well 
not align with that of the Vendor.  If a Reporter doesn’t get the answer they want to hear (be that right 
or wrong), their reaction could be anything from resigned acceptance to significant indignation.  In the 
latter case, action could take all forms, from harassment, to negative messages through the press and 
social media or even legal action.  Therefore, such a decision cannot be taken lightly, as previously 
discussed. 
With good management, a message from the Vendor delivered clearly and professionally, with a clear 
and justifiable rationale, is likely to be received with the good grace in which it was intended. 
If the relationship with the Reporter does unfortunately break down and somehow impacts progress 
of the process, the Vendor should: 
• Leave the process only after exhausting reasonable efforts to resolve the disagreement 
• Leave the process only after providing notice to the Reporter 
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3.5 Develop & Deploy Mitigating Solution 
Quite how a deliverable solution to a vulnerability is achieved by a Vendor is very much specific to that 
company and the product or service involved and falls out of scope of these guidelines.  However, the 
following points should be considered: 
•  If delivery dates are expected to slip in relation to what may have been agreed with the 
Reporter, the Reporter should be informed of the situation to help maintain 
engagement and goodwill. 
•  Depending on the Reporter’s skills and the nature of their relationship with the Vendor, 
a Vendor may wish to include the Reporter in testing of a pre-release version of the fix.  
This often maintains the goodwill of the Reporter, who in turn will be checking the fix 
against the original source of the identified problem. 
•  A software fix could be released as part of the Vendor’s standard patch/update delivery 
cycle, or perhaps made available as a one-off out-of-band release. Various 
circumstances will dictate which option to choose, such as timing of the Vendor’s 
standard patch/update cycle or the level of risk posed by the vulnerability.  
• Also consider whether information about the vulnerability should be passed on to other 
departments within the Vendor organisation, particularly customer facing ones. It 
should be kept in mind the conflicting considerations of sharing the details of a 
vulnerability too widely.  Where it is necessary to share vulnerability details with 
customers ahead of public advisories, the incident response team should be the sole 
source of the detail for such customer communication.  
 
3.6 Publish Advisory 
The organisation should have controlled disclosure channels for issuing security advisories to users and 
relevant stakeholders, and to inform them of the mitigating solution (if available).  It is advisable to 
contact all known users of the product before publicly disseminating the Advisory. This provides 
opportunity to mitigate the impact if a fix is not available (replace or isolate a device from any threat) 
or apply the fix before the vulnerability becomes public knowledge. Consideration will need to be given 
to how much lead time might be required to deploy the fix– especially if it is not automated. 
Stakeholders may also include anti-malware vendors and service providers. 
To support this early notification, the Vendor could have a mailing list via which alerts can be sent to 
subscribers (registered customers), providing details of the fix and where to find further information, 
e.g., a private download site for the signed software patch.  Depending how the product is purchased, 
the Vendor may be able to use existing customer contact details as another route to notify customers.  
It’s recommended Vendors digitally sign any Advisory to registered customers to demonstrate 
authenticity of the communication. 
Typically, a Vendor will have a web site where they publicly list details of upgrades, new features and 
advisories to their products, along with the relevant software downloads (which should be digitally 
signed, along with published hash values for each download package – see IoTSF Best Practice Guides 
for more details on this).  A new Advisory should only be listed here once registered customers have 
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had a reasonable opportunity to test and deploy the patch in advance within their own networks. The 
Vendor may provide help and assistance to users over social media channels and user forum 
communities. 
The Vendor should consider how they will publicly recognise the contribution from the Reporter.  It’s 
up to the Vendor to decide how they do this, but it should be done in agreement with the Reporter.  
An example might be a line in the Advisory such as the following: “We would like to thank <Reporter’s 
name> of <Reporter’s employer> for his/her valuable contribution in identifying this vulnerability and 
support while we developed the solution.”. 
 
3.7 Clean Up 
At some point the incident response team will need to close the vulnerability report.  The Vendor will 
need to decide at which stage of the process this should happen. Keep in mind that software patches 
don’t always behave as planned, especially if the fix was rolled out with some urgency.  It’s not 
uncommon to come across unexpected incompatibility issues or unforeseen side effects.  Thus, it may 
be prudent as a standard approach to keep the report open for 3 months (as an example) after public 
release of the Advisory to ensure unexpected issues get included in the vulnerability management 
reporting.   
3.7.1 Post Incident Review (PIR) 
It is recommended that a PIR is held with representatives from involved stakeholders about two weeks 
after the Advisory is publicly published, to review how the process was handled.  This meeting can 
consider and record lessons learned and generate any necessary actions to help improve how the 
vulnerability management process operates in the future.  
Careful analysis should be undertaken of the root cause(s) of the vulnerability and what other product 
families may also be impacted. There may have been an initial assessment during the development of 
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4 References and Abbreviations 
4.1 Organisations 
The following organisations are referenced in this document: 
ETSI  European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
IoTSF  Internet of Things Security Foundation 
NCSC  UK National Cyber Security Centre 




The following references are used in this document: 
1. ISO/IEC 29147:2018, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Vulnerability disclosure 
2. ISO/IEC 30111:2019, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Vulnerability handling 
processes 
3. National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) Vulnerability Disclosure Toolkit 
4. ETSI 303 645 v2.1.1 (2020-06) 
5. NIST SP 800-216(Draft) 
4.3 Definitions and Abbreviations 
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: 
(Security) 
Advisory 
An announcement or bulletin that informs users about a vulnerability in a 
product or service, usually including instructions on how to remediate the 
vulnerability 
CSIRT Computer Security Incident Response Team 
Data Breach Any incident that results in unauthorized access to data, networks, devices or 
services 
IoT Internet of Things 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
PIR Post Incident Review 
PSIRT Product Security Incident Response Team 
Reporter An individual or organization that notifies a Vendor of a potential vulnerability 
(ISO 29147 definition) 
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Vendor The individual or organization responsible for remediating vulnerabilities, 
typically the developer, maintainer, producer, manufacturer, supplier, installer, 
or provider of a product or service (ISO 29147 definition) 
Vulnerability A weakness in a system that can be exploited to compromise security 
Vulnerability 
Disclosure Policy 
A Vendor’s statement as to how they will handle any vulnerability report 
passed to them 
  
www.iotsecurityfoundation.org
